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Abstract
In the Kyrgyz Region of Ferghana Valley, violent conflict flares repeatedly between the local Kyrgyz majority
population and the Tajik ethnic minority. Drawing on a recent qualitative case study conducted in the borderlands
of one of the two Tajik enclaves within the Kyrgyz Batken Region, this article seeks to identify the causes of pasture-
related inter-ethnic conflict in the agro-pastoral Kyrgyz–Tajik border region. The paper employs an institutional
perspective and explores the impact of the given institutional setup. We note that a lack of institutional
arrangements for transboundary pasture use hinders Tajik herders’ legal access to the region’s sole summer
pastures. The Kyrgyz “Pasture Committee” has pragmatically designed local rules on transboundary pasture use in
the Kyrgyz–Tajik border region, thereby assuring Tajik herders at least semi-official access to the summer pastures.
Yet while these rules limit conflict, they fail to limit overstocking. Locally designed rules also open up business
opportunities to Tajik herders, which some of the Kyrgyz herders consider unfair and illegal. In order to achieve
sustainable and locally accepted regional pasture management, despite the lack of legislative amendments and
international agreements, we propose local-level institutional innovations. We also emphasize that pasture use
regulation is paramount for maintaining regional stability and peaceful cooperation.
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Introduction
Conflicts over the use of natural resources located in the
transboundary regions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are
an ongoing challenge to peaceful relationships between
the two countries. The formal constitutions of the five
independent Central Asian nation states which came
into effect in the 1990s, after the breakup of the USSR,
cemented the mainly nominal Soviet Republics’ borders
which were established during the 1920s and 1930s. The
current border lines are still not always clear and are fre-
quently contested. Of the 971-km border dividing
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, only 519 km has been offi-
cially agreed upon (Matveeva 2017). Since the turn of
the millennium, moreover, resurgent nationalism accom-
panied by growing expectations of specifically national
territorial rights has fueled inter-ethnic tensions over the
use of valuable natural resources in border areas, par-
ticularly in densely populated, ethnically mixed regions
such as the fertile Ferghana valley studied here (Reeves
2014), and conflict over transboundary resource use is
therefore rife. Seasonal livestock migration has generally
shrunk in scope (Kerven et al. 2011; Kerven et al. 2012),
yet it nonetheless remains vital to the survival of a rural
population dependent for its livelihood on livestock
herding and hence also on the strategic use of trans-
boundary rangelands. The situation in eight exterritorial
communities, so-called enclaves, of which six lie in the
Ferghana valley in the west of Kyrgyzstan, has proved es-
pecially problematic.
This article therefore focuses on conflicts over trans-
boundary pasture use in and around Tajik enclave in the
Batken Region, Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz media have reported
that violent conflicts erupt there between Kyrgyz and
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Tajik herders over their use of summer pastures. Escalat-
ing inter-ethnic clashes in the period ca. 2000–2013 are
sometimes referred to as the “ketmen war”, because the
Tajik and Kyrgyz communities resorted to using agricul-
tural hoes (ketmen) and stones as weapons. They also
used arson (burning down animal shelters on the sum-
mer pastures, for example), held hostages ransom, and
left a number of people injured (Toktomushev 2017). A
review of the available grey literature, exclusively
commissioned by non-governmental organizations,
shows that local non-governmental organizations's staff
considers the currently inadequate institutional frame-
work to be the “root cause” of these conflicts. They
agree that this framework fails to allocate clearly speci-
fied land rights (i.e. pasture rights) to both Kyrgyz and
Tajik herders: the latter suffer severe discrimination.
Yet the international scientific literature on trans-
boundary rangeland conflicts in Central Asia is very lim-
ited. While there is some literature on transboundary
water use conflicts in Central Asia (e.g. Vinogradov and
Langford 2001; Mosello 2008; Sehring 2009; Abdullaev
et al. 2006; Bichsel 2009) and on transboundary pasture
use conflicts in other parts of the world (e.g. Beyene
2009; Hundie 2010; Zelalem and Bayeh 2014), pasture
use conflicts in Central Asia have not received much at-
tention (Kerven et al. 2011). Exceptions can be found in
Dörre (2016) and Lim (2012), who explore frictions in
the Kyrgyz and Tajik legislation on pasture use.
In this article, we seek to identify which local-level
working rules on the governance of access to trans-
boundary rangelands in Central Asia have been drawn
up in light of that which previous research had
identified as “inappropriate formal property rights”
(see Lim 2012).
Analytical and theoretical framework
The Institutions of Sustainability (IoS) framework
(Hagedorn et al. 2002; Hagedorn 2008) serves to struc-
ture holistic studies on nature-related social-ecological
interaction from an institutional economics perspective.
It has been widely applied in studies of the impact of
property rights on natural resource use (e.g. Hamidov
and Thiel 2011; Crewett 2015a, 2015b; Prager 2010). In
the present study, we adopt the central premise of the
IoS, according to which the properties of the respective
transactions and the characteristics of the actors in-
volved determine which institutions (sets of rules) de-
velop, as well as through which governance structures
(organizational forms) these institutions will be imple-
mented in practice. When applying the IoS, we use the
interlinked theoretical elements: (a) the nature-related
transaction, (b) the characteristics of actors, (c) the gov-
ernance structure, and (d) the institutions, but we also
put some extra emphasis on working rules that we have
observed in the field (see Fig. 1).
In our study, the transaction is defined as “livestock
summer grazing by the residents of two neighboring
municipalities in the Kyrgyz–Tajik borderland”. We
thereby follow Hagedorn’s definition of a transaction ac-
cording to which “[t] he only requirement for an action
to be also called a transaction is that the actors involved
are affected due to a physical implication. [ … ] We only
assume that it always has some form of physical
realization that is relevant for the actors involved. Obvi-
ously, a transaction [ … ] is induced by a decision [that
is taken by] one or more actors, and affects one or more
actors” (Hagedorn 2008, 6–7). The studied transaction
in our case is a conflict that arises when Kyrgyz and
Tajik livestock raisers express differing perspectives on
Fig. 1 Analytical framework
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their respective rights to use certain summer pastures.
In this article, we use a slightly modified definition from
Cabot (2017), according to which “a conflict is the op-
position between two or more individuals or groups with
opposing interests, concerning the way to deal with an
issue” (Cabot 2017, 30), and may involve violence.
We define institutions as “systems of established rules,
conventions, norms, values and customs” (Fleetwood 2008,
247). Institutions embody “collective action in the control,
liberation, and expansion of individual action” (Commons
1931, 648), and in consequence, they determine the scope
of action open to actors involved in a studied transaction.
In this study, we focus on property rights. Property rights
are a specific form of institution that determines a person’s
right to enjoy defined benefit streams (Bromley 1991) that
ensue from the use of assets or resources. They therefore
distribute authority (Libecap 1989), power (Eggertsson
1996, 14), and wealth (Libecap 1989; Wiebe and Meinzen-
Dick 1998) within society, and they specify the position of
the actor with respect to resource utilization (Furubotn and
Pejovich 1972). The configuration of property rights is ac-
cordingly a very common source of conflict and a most
critical field of study in institutional economics. Property
rights in our case study are defined by the locally designed
rules governing the use of summer pastures in the Kyrgyz–
Tajik borderlands for grazing livestock.
Institutions differ with regard both to their respective
enforcement mechanisms and the degree of formality
these mechanisms have. Formal institutions are enforced
by means of formal legislation and the state. However,
the enforcement of informal institutions is based on un-
written rules and is executed by non-state actors (e.g.
Ostrom 2005, 139–174). The governance structure that
is implicit in any transaction can be defined as a group
of actors endowed with a bundle of rights to regulate the
transaction by enforcement of the existing set of institu-
tions. In our study, the governance structure is the le-
gally defined community-based management body.
We depart from the original IoS in which working rules
are only implicit. In our framework, we consider working
rules as a specific set of de facto rules that govern any
given real-world situation. Such rules are “common know-
ledge” and every actor “knows the rules, and knows that
others know the rules” (Ostrom 1990, 51). Working rules
might contain elements of the legal formal rules, of the
existing informal rules, and of the newly designed rules
which are effectively used, monitored, and “at least to
some extent” enforced (Ostrom 1990, 51).
Our adapted framework allows us to study the work-
ing rules that result from the interaction of all the ele-
ments in the framework. It also helps us study how (if at
all) “governance” as postulated in Institutional Econom-
ics serves to “craft order [and] thereby to mitigate con-
flict and realize mutual gains” (Williamson 2000, 599).
Study area
A Kyrgyz municipality (henceforce referred to as Muni-
cipality A) located in the transboundary rangelands of
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which shares a border with
the neighbouring Tajik enclave municipality (henceforth
referred to as Municipality B). According to the most re-
cent maps, the transboundary rangelands are Kyrgyz ter-
ritory. However, many Tajik herders depend for their
livelihood on the use of these pastures.
The Kyrgyz municipality A is located at an altitude of
1200 m above sea level. At the time of data collection, it
had 7500 inhabitants (NSC 2015). Seasonal migration
from May to October is part of the dominant production
system of raising livestock. In 2015, the total number of
cattle, sheep, goats, and horses was 21,774 animals (NSC
2015). Official statistics are, however, unreliable and
likely to underestimate the true number of animals graz-
ing on the pastures.
Methodology
Multiple data sources were used for the case study analysis,
including a review of the formal legislation, document ana-
lysis, expert and household interviews, and observations at
the study site. During field research in September 2015 and
August 2016, 35 semi-structured and open expert inter-
views (Bogner et al. 2009) were conducted with individuals
purposely selected from non-governmental and govern-
mental agencies, as well as with herding practitioners from
Municipality A and Municipality B (Table 1). Qualitative
content analysis (Mayring 2000) was deployed, namely by
using inductive and deductive coding for analysis of the
original interviews and documents.
Findings
In this section, we first describe the contested resource
(“The status of the contested pasture resource” section)
and then explore the features of the identified transac-
tion (“The transaction under study” section). We then
outline the formal institutions - in other words, the
regulatory framework for pasture use (“Formal property
rights to pasture use” section); explore actors and their
positions (“Actors” section); and outline the governance
structures involved (“Governance structures in Munici-
pality A (Kyrgyzstan)” section). In a final section
(“Working rules to access summer grazing areas” sec-
tion), we describe, in detail, the locally designed working
rules governing pasture access in the Kyrgyz–Tajik
transboundary region as well as how they contribute to
the mitigation or the escalation of conflict.
The status of the contested pasture resource
Natural pasture is the main fodder source both in the
Kyrgyz case study municipality, Municipality A, and the
neighbouring Tajik Municipality B. The total pasture
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area of Municipality A is 27,339 ha, which represents
55% of its entire area (NSC 2015). The pasture area
comprises six major pastures located at distances be-
tween 23 and 67 km from Municipality A. They can be
reached only via a road that crosses the Tajik municipal-
ity and its main village. All the pastures are used for
summer grazing. The pastures are considered to be a
scarce and limited resource. A current scientific assess-
ment of the pastures’ status is not available. However,
local respondents report increasing levels of degradation
that they estimate now affect 30–50% of the pasture
area. The limited availability of pastures leads to conflict
over grazing rights on those pastures. Table 2 lists the
pasture areas in the study region and shows conflict inci-
dence, as assessed by the two representatives of Munici-
pality A’s Pasture Committee interviewed. Of the six
pastures in the study region, four are subject to conflicts
over use rights. The intensity and frequency of conflict
evidently varies in line with the current demand for specific
sections of pasture. Our respondents reported, for instance,
that a pasture that is little sought-after owing to the low
quality of its forage plants is less affected by disputes.
The transaction under study
This paper explores transboundary access to summer
pastures in the Kyrgyz–Tajik borderlands for livestock
herders from both sides of the border. The transaction is
associated with an escalating and at times violent con-
flict. Tajik and Kyrgyz pasture users hold different views
on the distribution of property rights to these pastures.
The transaction at the root of the conflict occurs mainly
in summer, when herders from both sides of the border
move livestock to summer pastures located near the
contested border. The conflicting parties each lay claim
to a legitimate right to use the same pasture areas. Inter-
ethnic competition for the use of the Kyrgyz–Tajik
border pastures hence increases during the migration
period.
A brief summary of the history of grazing rights in the
case study region will aid understanding of the ongoing
conflict. Under Soviet rule, all livestock was in the
charge of large-scale state farms (sovkhoz) or so-called
collective farms (kolkhoz). The kolkhoz management
strictly regulated livestock operations, including the ani-
mals’ annual summer migration to higher pastures. The
farms employed herders who executed centrally de-
signed plans for rangeland use. Usually, the herders were
highly specialized, expert in herding a specific group of
animals, such as heifers or ewes, for each of which a
clearly delineated pasture use plan was drawn up. There
were two collective farms in the case study region: the
Tajik Isfara kolkhoz and the Kyrgyz Batken kolkhoz.
Amongst other forms of cooperation, a formal agree-
ment between the two kolkhozes permitted the Tajik kol-
khoz to put its livestock to graze on pastures allocated to
the Kyrgyz kolkhoz. Accordingly, kolkhoz herders from
both the Tajik village of Municipality B and the Kyrgyz
village of Municipality A used the four large pastures
Table 1 List of respondents
State representatives Pasture Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Melioration of the Kyrgyz Republic, staff member 1
International experts NGO Camp Ala-Too, staff member 1
NGO Rural Development Fund, staff member 1
UNDP, staff member 1
Mountain Society Research Institute, University of Central Asia, staff member 1
Local experts Municipality A municipality, mayor 1
Batken District Pasture Committee, chairman 1
Municipality A Municipality Pasture Committee, members 2
Municipality A Pasture User Union, members 2
Kyrgyz herders 15
Tajik herders 10
Table 2 List of summer pastures in the vicinity of the Municipality A and Municipality B communities
Pasture name Pasture category Distance in kilometres from Municipality A Pasture users Conflict incidence
Ulartoo Summer 26 Kyrgyz None
Tooshkandyk Summer/spring–autumn/winter 23 Kyrgyz
Bulak-Bashy Summer 35 Kyrgyz/Tajik Rare
Chechektir Summer 53 Kyrgyz /Tajik Frequent
Sharkyrama Summer/spring–autumn/winter 42 Kyrgyz/Tajik
Kishemish Summer/spring 67 Kyrgyz/Tajik
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located in the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic: Bulak-Bashy,
Kishemish, Sharkyrama, and Chechektir.
Formal property rights to pasture use
Legislative and judicial reform in the wake of the
breakup of the USSR caused a major disruption of graz-
ing patterns in Municipality A and Municipality B. The
demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s spelled
the end of its collective farms. Livestock was distributed
to the former kolkhoz workers who thereupon estab-
lished small family farms. In consequence, the vast ma-
jority of residents of Municipality A in Kyrgyzstan and
Municipality B in Tajikistan became livestock owners
with a year-round need for forage. Since the expiry in
2007 of the “Agreement on Basic Intergovernmental
Relations between the Republic of Tajikistan and the
Kyrgyz Republic” (concluded in Dushanbe, July 12,
1996), Tajik nationals’ access to and use of the trans-
boundary Kyrgyz pastures is no longer formally regu-
lated (Lim 2012). Both the exact location of the border
and the ownership of said pastures are contested. One
Soviet map from the period 1924–1939 defines the pas-
tures as Tajik; another from 1958–1959 defines them as
Kyrgyz; while the present Kyrgyz authorities consider
the entire pasture area (i.e. all six aforementioned pas-
tures) to be the property of the Kyrgyz Republic. This ef-
fectively deprives the Tajik municipality, Municipality B,
of access to the summer grazing pastures and recur-
rently triggers conflict.
This disputed pasture use in the transboundary region
is a direct consequence of historical institutional devel-
opments and the current state of Kyrgyz and Tajik for-
eign policy. Following the relocation of the Kyrgyz–Tajik
border in 1955, and again in 1967, both the Tajik and
Kyrgyz local communities came to consider the Bulak-
Bashy, Kishemish, Sharkyrama, and Chechektir pastures
as their common property, or at the least they laid claim
to traditional rights to use them. Since workers of both
the Kyrgyz and the Tajik kolkhozes shared uncontested
access to these pastures until 1989, they reasonably ex-
pect to be able to continue to use them. However, the
Kyrgyz herders currently claim exclusive use rights based
on both the location of the border on the aforemen-
tioned Soviet map from 1958–1959 and a law which
they interpret as a prohibition of Tajik owners grazing
livestock on said pastures, while the Tajik refer to the
map from the period 1924–1939 as well as to their trad-
itional rights to grazing those pastures. Currently, no
political consensus on the exact location of the border is
in sight and negotiations on the matter have come to a
halt (Shodiev 2019). This finding is no surprise and sup-
ports findings by Reeves (2014) and Lim (2012), each of
whom considers unclear borders a source of conflict,
namely because, in the absence of clearly demarcated
borders, contested property rights continue to fuel con-
flict over access to and use of natural resources in com-
munities located in transboundary regions.
Current Kyrgyz legislation fails to offer adequate guid-
ance on the question of pasture use by non-Kyrgyz na-
tionals in the border region near the Tajik enclave (Lim
2012). Article 3 and Article 10 of the first version of the
law “On Pastures” published January 26, 2009 (Kyrgyz
Republic 2009), proclaim ownership of a “pasture ticket”
(a receipt of payment for grazing fees levied by the local
Pasture Committee) to be a prerequisite of pasture ac-
cess. Article 12 of the same law makes provision for pas-
ture use by foreigners: “foreign legal entities and
individuals” may use “unused pastures on the basis of
interstate and intergovernmental agreements ratified by
the Jogorku Kenesh [parliament] of the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic”. As no such intergovernmental agreements are cur-
rently in place, and as pasture tickets are available solely
to local Kyrgyz herders resident within the jurisdiction
of a community-based Pasture Committee, the above
law introduced a de facto ban on foreign nationals’ legal
access to grazing. The Act No. 254 of December 12,
2011, amended the law of 2009; however, Article 12 was
revoked. Since then, no further specific regulation of for-
eign nationals’ access to and use of Kyrgyz pasture has
come into force.
Actors
In this section, we outline all the actors involved in the
transaction. We thereby deal with them in groups, in
light of certain characteristics. In other words, we note
each actor group’s overall professional respectively eco-
nomic interests, its stake in the summer grazing transac-
tion, and its (and/or its rivals’) deployment of strategy
(or strategies) (see Table 3 for an overview).
Residents of both the Kyrgyz municipality A and the
Tajik municipality B currently seek access to the Muni-
cipality A’s summer pastures. Neither community can
access alternative pastures for grazing its livestock. The
Kyrgyz and Tajik pasture users engaged in summer mi-
gration to Municipality A’s pastures fall largely into two
groups: firstly, there are Tajik and Kyrgyz livestock
raisers who drive their own animals to the summer pas-
tures and whom we call “self-employed herders”; sec-
ondly, there are the Kyrgyz and Tajik “herding service
providers” who generally do not own the animals in their
charge during the summer migration period.
Self-employed herders usually raise livestock as a fam-
ily business. Their herd size is sufficiently large to make
independent summer migration profitable, for the latter
requires substantial investment in equipment and staff
and is therefore feasible only with a minimum herd size
of 300 small ruminants (Wenzel 2016). In our analysis,
we ignore the fact that some of the relatively wealthy
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herders sometimes integrate in their stock a smaller
number of their neighbours’ animals.
Herding service providers offer summer grazing on the
remote summer pastures of Municipality A. This is usu-
ally their main source of income, since their personal
livestock raising business is relatively small. Service
buyers are individual livestock raisers whose herds are
too small to make independent migration feasible.
They xoften own only a very small number of animals
for subsistence purposes. Herding service providers
offer their service to small livestock raisers who pay a
herding service fee per head of animal grazed. Often,
cooperation between livestock raisers and herding
service providers (often members of the same family)
is long-standing.
The governing body is represented by members of the
Pasture Committee, the executive elected body of the
Pasture User Union in Municipality A, and to which the
Kyrgyz legislation “On Pasture” allots the sole legal right
to issue grazing permits (“pasture tickets”). Pasture
Committees in Kyrgyzstan administer three types of sea-
sonal pasture in the vicinity of herder communities:
grazing in summer, in spring–autumn, and in winter. A
key task of the Pasture Committee is to control access to
the pasture areas and thereby ensure that animals are
registered, in order then to draw up sustainable pasture
use plans for the otherwise, often, overstocked pastures
(Crewett 2012).
The last group of actors involved in the borderland
conflict is the Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards who
Table 3 Conflict partners and their conflicting positions on transboundary pasture use around the Tajik enclave, Municipality B
Actor groups Actor characteristics
Pasture users
Actors’
nationality
Actor groups’ main economic
interest
Actor groups’ interest in summer
grazing transaction
Actor groups’ shared strategy
Municipality A
herder/ self
employed
K Herd weight gain Secure access to good quality
pastures; low number of co-users
of summer pastures
Lobby for exclusion of Tajik herders from
Municipality A pasture
Municipality A
herder/ service
provider
K Increase income from herding
service sales
Secure access to good quality
pastures; low number of co-users
of summer pastures
Some incorporate additional unregistered
animals from Municipality B without
buying grazing permits for them
lobby for exclusion of Tajik herders from
Municipality A pasture
Municipality A
livestock owner/
service buyer
K Herd weight gain; livestock security
during summer migration
Presence of service providers with
access to high-quality pastures;
low grazing service fees
Lobby for exclusion of Tajik herders from
Municipality A pasture
Municipality A
Pasture
Committee
K Sustainability of pasture use;
mitigate pasture use conflicts
Control number of pasture users Issue and control possession of Kyrgyz
herders’ grazing permits:
accept grazing fee payments from Tajik
herders
Municipality B
livestock owner/
service buyer
T Herd weight gain; livestock security
during summer migration
Presence of service providers with
access to high-quality pastures;
low grazing service fees
Buy grazing service from Kyrgyz herders
support Kyrgyz herding service providers
during passage through Municipality B and
at border checkpoints
Municipality B
herder/service
provider
T Increase income from herding
service sales
Secure pasture access; low cost for
pasture access
Unauthorized grazing
or
payment of informal grazing fee to the
Municipality A Pasture Committee
Municipality B
herder/
self employed
T Herd weight gain; livestock security
during summer migration
Secure pasture access; low cost for
pasture access
Unauthorized grazing
or
payment of informal grazing fee to the
Municipality A Pasture Committee
Governance structure
Actors’
nationality
Actor groups’ main professional
interest
Actor groups’ interest in summer
grazing transaction
Actor groups’ shared strategy
Border guards K Prevent conflict with superiors;
protect Kyrgyz territory (pasture)
from foreign nationals’ access
Secure extra income Request illegal fee for ignoring Tajik
herders’ illegal pasture use
Pasture
Committee
members
K Ensure sustainable use of pastures;
prevent pasture use conflict
Secure extra income Request illegal grazing fee from Tajik
herders
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control passers-by at various checkpoints in the border
region in our case study.
Governance structures in Municipality A (Kyrgyzstan)
The “On Pasture” law (passed January 26, 2009, No. 30)
regulates the use of pasture for grazing purposes. The
law declares the pastures in question to be the property
of the Kyrgyz Republic and establishes a community-
based governance structure for pasture management.
Each municipality has a community-based organization,
the so-called Pasture User Union, which comprises all
the local pasture users and is headed by its elected
executive body, the so-called Pasture Committee. The
Pasture Committee issues annual grazing permits (“pasture
tickets”) to the Kyrgyz community’s herders. It is respon-
sible for fixing and collecting grazing fees and for allocating
and monitoring individual grazing rights. The grazing fee
varies according to the type of animal grazed. A grazing
schedule drawn up by the Pasture Committee regulates the
seasonal allocation of grazing spots on the pastures. The
Pasture Committee is in charge of pasture use and is
responsible also for the resolution of any pasture-related
conflict (Crewett 2012, 2015a; Kasymov et al. 2016).
All direct users of the Municipality A community’s pas-
tures, be they self-employed or herding service providers,
must buy pasture tickets in accordance with the number
of animals in their charge. At the time of data collection,
the fee structure for the entire grazing period was as
follows: 7 Kyrgyz som (0.10 USD) per head for small rumi-
nants, 35 som (0.50 USD) per head for large ruminants,
and 50 som (0.73 USD) per head for horses. Under the
current management regime in place in Kyrgyzstan, pas-
ture ticket registration is of major importance for pasture
management, the data it provides being the basis on which
both the pasture use plan (how much livestock/where)
and the grazing schedule (pasture access/when) are drawn
up. Pasture ticket registration hence allows the de facto
stocking rates to be calculated for each grazing spot. In
Municipality A, the grazing schedule and the grazing fees
are agreed upon during meetings of its community Pas-
ture Committee, in spring, prior to the summer migration.
Neither Tajik herders nor their delegates are present at
those meetings. Throughout the summer grazing period,
representatives of the Pasture Committee make in situ
permit checks. As mentioned above, there are currently
no regulations in place on how to deal with the grazing
interests—respectively the access to and use of specific
sections of pasture—of those livestock raisers who are not
resident within the jurisdiction of the relevant Kyrgyz
Pasture Committee.
Working rules to access summer grazing areas
The grazing dilemma caused by poorly defined legal rights
to pasture use in the Kyrgyz Tajik border region in
Municipality A and Municipality B has led Kyrgyz and
Tajik herders and livestock raisers to develop three dis-
tinct sets of working rules (see Table 4 for an overview).
Firstly, we observe unauthorized grazing on the sum-
mer pasture by Tajik herders from Municipality B. These
herders either are self-employed (i.e. have their own
herd) or provide a herding service to citizens in their
hometown of Municipality B. However, they neither
hold a grazing permit nor are they lawfully registered
users of the pastures. They do not acknowledge the Pas-
ture Committee as the lawful governance body of the
pastures, as they claim the pastures are in the territory
of Tajikistan. A second line of defence amongst these
Tajik herders is their own or their families’ long-
standing history of working those pastures during the
Soviet period, which they perceive as amounting to
“traditional use rights”. If these herders come to the at-
tention of the Pasture Committee representatives who
patrol the pastures, they could be evicted for non-
compliance with Kyrgyz legislation, which defines the
pastures as Kyrgyz. Yet the Pasture Committee generally
refrains from forcefully evicting Tajik herders from the
summer pastures within its jurisdiction. The Pasture
Committee members interviewed said they turn a blind
eye to unauthorized grazing by unregistered herders,
since their reluctant acceptance of it is a means to pre-
vent further outbreaks of conflict.
Secondly, we find informally authorized grazing by
Tajik livestock owners from Municipality B. This is a
strategy by which Tajik herders acquire informal grazing
permits from the Kyrgyz Pasture Committee by making
payment of an “informal grazing fee”. As Tajik citizens
are not granted a formal right to obtain a regular pasture
ticket, they are allowed to purchase informal grazing
rights from the Kyrgyz Pasture Committee. The informal
grazing arrangement is a verbal arrangement between
the herder and a Pasture Committee member. The
herder does not receive any formal proof of the pay-
ment. According to our interview partners, the grazing
fee levied is 10 times higher than the amount Kyrgyz
herders have to pay (300 som per sheep for Tajik
herders and 35 som for Kyrgyz herders). The herder also
has to pay for the use of each pasture separately. Migra-
tory grazing usually involves the rotational use of three
different pastures per year. Owners of regular pasture
tickets pay once to obtain the right to use three different
pastures. The informal grazing permit, however, has to
be bought for each of the pastures. This means that
Tajik herders not only pay 10 times the usual grazing fee
but, in effect, 30 times the price a Kyrgyz herder pays.
Payment of the informal grazing fees protects Tajik
herders if ever a Pasture Committee member attempts
to evict them during his inspection of the summer pas-
tures. But it certainly does not protect them from other
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Kyrgyz pasture users’ attempts to chase them off certain
sections of the pasture. There is no legal basis for evic-
tion attempts by the Pasture Committee, since neither
the responsible state body nor the local Pasture User
Union to which the Pasture Committee is formally ac-
countable has ever passed regulations to this effect. The
“informal grazing fee” is an unspoken reality nonethe-
less, and it represents an informal benefit for the Pasture
Committee members.
Thirdly, we identify Kyrgyz herders’ provision of unregis-
tered herding and grazing services to Tajik livestock
owners. This operation is framed by the regular herding
contract between the herder service provider and his client,
the buyer, which Kyrgyz contract partners likewise make:
the herder registers each animal put in his charge and takes
on the responsibility for its safety and well-being during the
summer grazing period. However, Kyrgyz herders and Tajik
livestock owners negotiate the service fee themselves, which
is very profitable for the Kyrgyz herder. According to our
interviewees, the Tajik service buyer has to pay a herding
fee of 300 som, i.e. 6.6 times the fee a Kyrgyz livestock
owner pays for the same service. Tajik and Kyrgyz livestock
owners and herders cooperate closely on this project. The
Kyrgyz herding service provider and the Tajik client (live-
stock owner) arrange the date, place, and time where the
livestock will be gathered. The client and Kyrgyz herder
meet shortly before the latter crosses the border into the
Municipality B enclave. The Tajik client supports the usu-
ally difficult passage of the Kyrgyz herder’s herd through
the Tajik municipality border area, so as to avoid problems
such as the possible theft of Kyrgyz animals. After passing
through Municipality B, the Tajik clients’ animals are incor-
porated into the Kyrgyz herder’s herd. One or two Tajik
helpers then help the herder make the second Tajik border
crossing to reach his final destination, the pasture.
Grazing of this sort is considered illegal by the majority
of the Kyrgyz herders and leads to conflict amongst the
Kyrgyz herders and the local Pasture Committee. It is a
violation of the regulations if a Kyrgyz herder illegally
brings a number of unregistered animals to the pastures
and likewise if he fails to pay the Kyrgyz Pasture Commit-
tee a grazing fee for each animal (pasture ticket purchase).
De-escalation effects of the working rules
In allocating specific pasture rights to both Kyrgyz and
Tajik herders, the Pasture Committee prevents direct
competition between the two groups for the exact same
grazing plots. In light of current tensions in the area, we
believe this to be an important factor for conflict mitiga-
tion, or at the least for preventative de-escalation. The
Pasture Committee also buffers conflict amongst Kyrgyz
and Tajik herders, as the Kyrgyz, upon meeting Tajik
herders with informal grazing permits on the pastures,
approach the Pasture Committee to complain about it
having granted access rights to their rivals. While the ac-
tivities of the Pasture Committee seem to violate formal
regulations—and lead also to illegal payments (“back-
handers” or bribes) to Pasture Committee members—
they serve to lessen direct confrontation between Tajik
and Kyrgyz herders. We believe that in the absence of
the Pasture Committee’s inclusive pasture registration
scheme there would be more direct and open conflict
between Tajik and Kyrgyz pasture users.
The Pasture Committee does not strictly enforce
Kyrgyz-only herding on the summer pastures under its
jurisdiction. Our data shows that the Pasture Commit-
tee, in order to avoid further conflict, does not forcefully
evict the Tajik herders from the pastures within its juris-
diction. We conclude that the Pasture Committee, in
drawing up locally designed rules that pragmatically ex-
tend grazing rights to Tajik herders, substantially re-
duces the potential for local conflict and, undeniably,
also the frustration Tajik herders would feel if they were
completely denied access to the summer pastures.
Escalation effects of the working rules
The Pasture Committee has an ambiguous role. We note
that, although some of its actions partly mitigate conflict,
they also at times aggravate conflict.
Table 4 Distribution of benefits and sustainability impact of property rights institutions in place
Ethics approval and consent to
participate
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Unauthorized, unregistered use by Tajik citizens Beneficiaries: unauthorized herders
Losers: all pasture users who respect
the pasture use plan
Too few animals are registered. Drafting the
correct pasture use plan is therefore impossible.
Authorized, unregistered use Beneficiaries: Pasture Committee
members; buyers of grazing permits
Losers: Kyrgyz pasture users who
respect the pasture use plan
Illegal practice; illegal income for the Pasture
Committee
Too few animals are registered. Drafting the
correct pasture use plan is therefore impossible.
Tajik livestock raisers’ unregistered purchase of herding
services from Kyrgyz herding service providers
Beneficiaries: herding service
providers with Tajik clients
Losers: herding service providers with
Tajik clients
Too few animals are registered. Drafting the
correct pasture use plan is therefore impossible.
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Firstly, we observe non-consensual decision-making
on pasture rights. There is neither formal legal provision
in Kyrgyzstan nor clear consensus amongst the Kyrgyz
herders for Tajik herders’ gaining de facto access to
grazing on contested transboundary pastures. The law
does not expressly sanction Kyrgyz herders who graze
animals owned by non-Kyrgyz nationals, but there is evi-
dently a need for further clarification by legal experts of
the legality (or not) of herding service provision to for-
eign nationals, as well as for a definitive statement on
the matter by the state authorities. The Pasture Commit-
tee’s tolerance of Tajik access in return for informal
grazing fee payments does not have the approval of the
Kyrgyz community. Our fieldwork suggests that the
tacitly accepted presence of Tajik herders on summer
pastures contributes to conflict aggravation.
Secondly, the current rules in place do not foster sus-
tainable pasture use, as stocking rates are not restricted.
There are a great many non-registered animals on the
pastures because the Pasture Committee issues informal
grazing permits without ensuring in parallel that the cor-
responding quantity of livestock is incorporated (i.e. cal-
culated for) in its pasture use plans. In other words, the
Pasture Committee is not in a position either to formu-
late a fully transparent grazing schedule or to publicly
communicate approved stocking rates, because it
cannot officially include in its pasture use plans the
livestock of those Tajik herders from whom it accepts
“informal grazing fees”, i.e. “backhanders” or bribes.
The Pasture Committee’s locally designed rules
contribute, therefore, to further aggravating the
demand for—as well as the severe depletion of—the
pastures within its jurisdiction.
Thirdly, the costs and revenue distribution resulting
from informal grazing regulation is considered unfair by
the Kyrgyz herders (or at least by those who do not par-
ticipate in illegally grazing Tajik-owned animals). As
many of our respondents see it, the overall Kyrgyz
herders’ community has to carry the cost of the increase
in the number of animals allowed onto the summer pas-
tures. A complete ban on Tajik-owned livestock would
be preferable to some, as currently only the Pasture
Committee itself and the service providers who herd
Tajik livestock reap any benefits. It seems likely that the
unofficial (i.e. non-registered) provision of grazing rights
to Tajik herders is a source of additional undeclared in-
come for certain Pasture Committee members. Evi-
dently, the Pasture Committee thereby exploits the Tajik
herders’ lack of alternatives, levying a grazing fee from
them that is not only illegal but also extraordinarily high,
namely 30 times the fee the Kyrgyz herders pay. The
Pasture Committee thereby respects the rules of the
market, however, inasmuch as it levies the exact same
amount that an illegal Kyrgyz herding service provider
would charge a Tajik livestock owner (namely 10 times
the fee a Kyrgyz client has to pay).
However, we find that Tajik herders have no choice
but to accept the high service fee requested by Kyrgyz
herders. Service provision to Tajik clients causes major
arguments between Kyrgyz herders, since those who do
not make money from illegally grazing Tajik livestock
decry the practice.
We note mixed outcomes of the locally designed rules
for transboundary pasture access. We believe that fur-
ther conflict between Tajik and Kyrgyz herders is re-
duced in part, since Tajik herders gain a grazing
opportunity, albeit an informal and insecure one. On the
other hand, we observe that informal grazing permits ag-
gravate and multiply conflict between Kyrgyz herders
and the Kyrgyz Pasture Committee and they exacerbate
depletion of the pastures, to the detriment of the local
community. Local Kyrgyz herders/Pasture User Union
members do not accept the Pasture Committee’s conflict
mitigation strategy, since they consider that it fails to
take into account their interests and those of the broader
Municipality A community. These additional conflicts
within the Kyrgyz community complicate the underlying
tensions between the pasture users on each side of the
Kyrgyz–Tajik border.
Sustainable pasture use—first and foremost the pre-
vention of overstocking—is by no means at the top of
the local policymakers’ agenda. We find that no clear
rules are in place on the grazing of non-locally registered
animals, on formal options for pasture use by foreign na-
tionals, or on regulation of the herding business.
We also note that community-based management does
not prevent those holding office within community-
based organizations (notably, Pasture Committee mem-
bers) from circumventing the law or diverting public
revenue for their own benefit.
The locally designed rules now in place go somewhat
further than those enshrined in the law “On Pastures” of
2009. They cover the matter of commercial non-local
herding. Yet the rules, being inadequate, invite violation.
In other words, the fact that livestock owned and/or
herded by Tajik citizens cannot be registered means it
cannot be incorporated in any pasture use plans. And
this—since Tajik livestock raisers inevitably have to find
alternative solutions—leads to bribery and overstocking.
We find positive and critical aspects in the pragmatic
rule sets drawn up by the Pasture Committee. Two in-
terpretations are possible. One could consider that the
Pasture Committee’s rulemaking fosters illegal graz-
ing, the pocketing of bribes, and failure to enforce
lawful use of the Kyrgyz pastures. One could equally
acknowledge that the Pasture Committee plays an im-
portant role in conflict regulation. The locally de-
signed rules are pragmatic and locally applicable, and
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they mitigate inter-ethnic tension in relation to pas-
ture use. We see, however, that the rules in place fail
to improve the sustainability of pasture use, fail to
fairly distribute benefits from the use of the commons
(i.e. the pastures traditionally maintained for the pub-
lic good), and thereby cause ongoing conflict amongst
the Kyrgyz Pasture Committee, its constituencies, and
the Kyrgyz herders themselves.
Discussion
We find the Kyrgyz community-based Pasture Commit-
tees to be a key actor in the conflict situation. The Pas-
ture Committee, being the only local-level organization
concerned with pasture administration, is accepted as
the major governance body by the Kyrgyz and, surpris-
ingly, by a number of Tajik herders; for given that Tajik
herders dispute Kyrgyzstan’s territorial claim to the pas-
tures, one could expect them to dispute the authority of
the Kyrgyz Pasture Committee.
Our study shows that the Pasture Committee is en-
gaged in institutional design in relation to pasture use.
In general, the Kyrgyz law “On Pasture” (2009) encour-
ages the design of local pasture use regulations by the
local pasture user community and the executive local
Pasture Committee. Our study finds that the Kyrgyz Pas-
ture Committee and Kyrgyz herding service providers
design working rules in order to cope with the pasture
demand amongst Tajik livestock raisers. Local-level
working rule design by the Kyrgyz Pasture Committee
approves extra-legal grazing of Tajik animals by Kyrgyz
and Tajik herders in exchange for illegal extra payments
to the Pasture Committee and high service fees to the
Kyrgyz herders. Those rules partly serve to prevent the
further escalation of open conflicts. Options for some
members of the Kyrgyz community, including Pasture
Committee members, to seek to make a profit may,
however, cause future conflict aggravation. We also find
that these rules completely fail to control animal num-
bers and so cannot ensure sustainable use of the natural
(pasture) resource.
Our study is the first scientific study to analyse the im-
pact of local-level rule design on conflicts surrounding
summer pasture use in the Kyrgyz–Tajik borderland. It
shows that, contrary to media coverage and other re-
ports that generally refer only to contested land rights
for cropping purposes and/or the conflicts occurring in
relation to the construction of a road that crosses the
Tajik enclave of Municipality B, summer pastures are in
fact a massively contested issue and a cause of conflict
in the Kyrgyz–Tajik borderlands. Our findings therefore
support those of Lim (2012), author of the to-date sole
published study of transboundary pasture management
in the Kyrgyz–Tajik borderland. While Lim explores
gaps in formal regulation in great detail, our study looks
at the institutional design on the ground, in other words,
at how local administrators muddle through, designing
rules ad hoc to compensate for gaps in the current
legislation.
Lim (2012) emphasizes the need for international
agreements on border location and pasture management
institutions and organizations. Our study goes a step in
the same direction, specifying the need for further regu-
lation of Kyrgyz herders’ service provision to Tajik live-
stock raisers and the importance of finding a legal
strategy for integrating foreign raisers’ livestock into
Kyrgyz herd management plans.
Yet the working rules in place are not a sustainable so-
lution to long-term conflict resolution, as their design
does not respect important criteria for sustainable rule
design.
Our study raises some issues concerning the effective-
ness of community-based pasture management under
the conditions prevailing in Kyrgyz border communities.
It demonstrates the ability of local-level rule designers to
draft locally designed rules. The rules thus designed go
further than the operative regulations enshrined in the
“On Pastures” law of 2009. Community-based manage-
ment is meant to support locally tailored rule design by
local-level decision-makers as this is believed to lead to
more suitable rule configurations. The case study ob-
served here is therefore in line with theoretical assump-
tions on the local appropriateness of locally designed
rules (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2010; Agrawal and
Ostrom 2001). We see, however, that local rule design
does not otherwise fulfil the hopes associated with
community-based natural resource management, for this
includes local control of authorities’ leeway for discre-
tion and of decision-makers and resource flows. The de-
signed rules neither support transparent local-level
management of public resources nor foster community
involvement. Our study therefore is in agreement with
findings from Crewett (2015a, 2015b), who reported on
difficulties that Pasture Committees face in attempting
to organize sustainable pasture use rotations and the in-
ability of local residents to monitor actions taken by the
Pasture Committee.
Conclusion
In our case study, we find a formal institutional frame-
work with gaps in three important areas: border demar-
cation, transnational grazing rights, and herding service
provision regulations. The working rules in place are not
fit either to mitigate transboundary conflict or to ensure
sustainable pasture use. We therefore conclude that
there is a need for intergovernmental agreement on pas-
ture use in the region under study in order to permit
herders of both nationalities rangeland access for graz-
ing. In the absence of such agreement, and assuming
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that the pastures continue to be considered Kyrgyz terri-
tory, it might be helpful to explore regulatory strategies
for the legal access of Tajik-owned livestock to Kyrgyz
pastures. Such regulation would bring clear benefits to
the entire Kyrgyz pasture user community. Conceivable
is the introduction of higher grazing fee rates for non-
local pasture users, as this would increase the income of
the Pasture User Union and could support investment in
pasture infrastructure or winter forage banks. Herding
service fees should be the same for both Tajik and Kyrgyz
livestock raisers. Both the above regulations would de-
crease local-level conflict in relation to Tajik pasture use.
We personally propose, moreover, that these regulations
be complemented by strictly enforced livestock border
controls at Veterinary Border inspection posts.
In more general terms, it is evident that the strict regula-
tion of livestock numbers on the summer pastures is im-
perative. Increasing grazing fees overall would possibly be
the most effective way to motivate herders to reduce their
stock. A sliding grazing fee that makes herding very large
numbers of animals less profitable than at present might
help meet the needs of the most disadvantaged members of
the community, i.e. impoverished subsistence farmers.
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